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This paper longitudinally explores the technology positioning strategies, i.e. 
block membership or non-block membership, in interorganizational networks 
that maximize innovative performance. Hence, we will derive some basic 
propositions on the effect of block membership on innovative performance 
under various network evolutionary conditions, i.e. structure reinforcing or 
structure-loosening developments in the industry. Empirical testing is 
performed on the microelectronics industry from 1980-2000.
1. Introduction 
Over the past years, several authors have addressed the question of the effectiveness 
of relational and structural embeddedness on company performance (see, e.g. Rowley, 
Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000). Many authors have argued that strong ties are 
particularly effective under conditions of relative stability, whereas weak ties are 
particularly geared towards dynamic industry environments (e.g. Rowley et al., 2000; 
Uzzi, 1997; Larson 1992). Others (e.g. Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) have found 
that under conditions of turbulence a satisficing strategy employing many, seemingly 
redundant, alliances might be more effective to increase firm performance than an 
optimisation strategy that is geared towards bridging structural holes. 
 
Although we share the notion of some of these authors that “… the degree of 
uncertainty and required rate of innovation in the environment influence the 
appropriate network configurations…”(Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000: 370), 
we argue that these findings are, above all, contingent on the stage of a network’s 
evolution. With the latter we refer to the evolution of a network that is either 
structure-reinforcing or structure-loosening (Madhavan, Koka, Prescott, 1998), caused 
by incremental technological developments or disruptive technologies (e.g. Bower, 
Christensen, 1995), respectively. 
 
The main aim of our paper is to improve our basic understanding of how firms should 
position themselves under various network conditions, in order to maximize their   3
innovative rents. More in particular, we examine two basic strategies that can be 
pursued in terms of either block membership or non-block membership. Using 
Coleman’s (1988) closure arguments and Burt’s (1992) structural holes argument we 
will first address the effect of closure advantages and disadvantages as well as broker 
advantages and disadvantages on strategic block formation in (international) alliance 
networks. Then, we will content that these advantages are contingent on the stage of 
an alliance network’s evolution. In particular, we will study the interrelationship 
between network evolution and block dynamics. In the next part, we will derive some 
basic propositions on the effect of block membership on innovative performance 
under various network evolutionary conditions.  
 
2. Theoretical background  
Research on alliances has made significant progress in exploring the question of why 
and when alliances are formed (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Powell & Brantley, 1992). 
More recently, research has also made progress in advancing our understanding of 
“with whom” firms are likely to form alliances (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Gulati, Gargiulo, 
1999). In dealing with the competitive implications of alliances, research has either 
focused on the performance/financial benefits of alliance formation (Berg, Duncan, & 
Friedman, 1982; Hagedoorn, 1993) or examined the implications of trust, 
opportunism, partner rivalry, and sustained cooperation as a means of achieving 
competitive benefits (Gulati, 1995; Hill, 1990). Adopting a transaction cost 
perspective or a social network perspective, researchers have attempted to examine 
the relationship between governance mechanisms and the evolution of trust and its 
implications for realizing benefits of cooperation (Gulati, 1995). In examining the 
relationship between competition and cooperation, research (with the exception of the 
strategic behaviour approach) has largely focused upon the internal characteristics of 
the alliance. It is argued that it is important to acknowledge the mixed-motive nature 
(competition plus cooperation) of alliances and its implications for dependence, trust, 
and mutual benefit (Singh & Mitchell, 1996). Although this approach has served to 
considerably advance our understanding of the internal process of alliance dynamics, 
it is lacking in improving our current understanding of the external competitive 
implications of alliance relationships. In other words, despite its insightful focus on 
the alliance, this line of research has been primarily introspective and has not yet   4
begun to incorporate in its research domain the external competitive environment in 
which the alliance competes.  
The rapid proliferation of alliances has not only ushered in a new era of cooperation 
among companies big and small, but it also started a new era of competition between 
alliances. Cooperative agreements have become an integral part and a cornerstone of 
competitive strategies. “Competition through cooperation” has become the mainstay 
of a firm’s attempt to gain financial and survival advantages. The virtual explosion of 
cooperative agreements on a worldwide basis has led to a new form of competition: 
group versus group rather than company versus company (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). 
Research by Gomes-Casseres (1996) and by Doz and Hamel (1998) is among the first 
to have explored the increasing frequency of collaboration as a reflection of a 
fundamental shift from the traditional form of competition (firm vs. firm) to a new 
form (group vs. group). By laying the foundation for this unexplored yet critical field 
of enquiry, these researchers have provided a basis for investigating the underlying 
principles of and antecedents to alliance competition. 
 
We will address this important issue from a social networks perspective. This 
perspective explains the actions of actors in terms of their position in networks of 
relationships (e.g. Nohria, 1992; Gulati, 1998). From a social network perspective 
organizations are embedded in a set of social relations that is often referred to as their 
social capital. Thus, social capital refers to the network of relations as well as the 
resources that may be accessed and mobilized through that network (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Burt, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998; Lin, 1999). Social capital comprises aspects 
like social context, such as social ties, trusting relations, and value systems that 
facilitate the actor’s behavior if located within that context (Tsai and Ghosal, 1998). 
These different aspects of social context are labeled the structural, the relational, and 
the cognitive dimensions of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and 
Ghosal, 1998). We will argue that network embeddedness can be seen as an important 
determinant of the innovative success of companies. 
 
Embeddedness refers to the fact that economic action and outcomes are affected by 
the partners’ relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations 
(Granovetter, 1992; Gulati, 1998). Granovetter (1985, 1992) distinguishes relational, 
structural and positional embeddedness. Relational embeddedness focuses on the role   5
of direct links as a mechanism for knowledge acquisition (Gulati, 1998). Structural 
embeddedness stresses the informational value of the structural position that actors 
occupy in the network (Gulati, 1998). Positional embeddedness captures the actor’s 
roles in the social system and refers to the impact of the positions actors occupy in the 
structure of the alliance network on their decisions in alliance formation process 
(Gulati, Gargiulo, 1999). Embeddedness implies that the behavior and relations of 
partner firms in the network influence the focal firm’s actions. Firms are actually 
caught in a web of relations that on the one hand puts restraints on their behavior and 
on the other hand can be used to their advantage. Hereby, interconnectedness 
(structural embeddedness) involves norm creation at the network level; whereas 
relational embeddedness creates trust at the dyadic level (Rowley, Behrens, 
Krackhardt, 2000). 
 
2.1 Block membership 
Block membership can be seen as one of the strongest forms of social embeddedness. 
The effect of block membership on the innovative performance of companies can 
therefore be seen in the light of the current debate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of social embeddedness. In this debate on social capital (e.g. Rowley, 
Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000) the basic arguments stem 
from Burt’s (1992) structural hole argument versus Coleman’s (1988) closure 
argument. Coleman (1988) argues that being part of a dense and redundant network is 
advantageous since it involves trust and cooperation among its members. Hence, firms 
engage in local search as a result of their social capital (Burt, 1992) and 
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998). Existing inter-firm cooperative ties 
provide the infrastructure for future alliance formation (Chung, Sing, and Lee, 2000). 
In other words, the current relations of a firm stem from its prior relational activities 
and form the basis upon which the actor establishes future social relations (Gulati, 
1998; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; Chung, Sing, and Lee, 2000). Through these 
ties, strategic blocks (Nohria, Garcia-Pont, 1991) or cohesive subgroups (Wasserman 
and Faust, 1994) of densely connected partners emerge in the strategic alliance 
network. These blocks or groups are characterized by highly cohesive subsets of 
similar actors (Knoke and Kuklinsky, 1992). In either case, actors who maintain 
especially cohesive bonds among themselves are more likely to act “similarly, to   6
share information, to develop similar preferences, or to act in concert” (Knoke and 
Kuklinsky, 1992: 56). 
On the contrary, Burt (1992) suggests that firms embedded in sparsely connected 
networks will enjoy brokerage advantages based on access to non-redundant 
information (Rowley, Behrens, Krackhardt, 2000). Through ‘information access, 
timing, referrals and control’ (Burt, 1992: 62) strategic opportunities are raised as 
firms form bridges between densely connected and redundant parts of the network and 
other non-redundant parts through structural holes or disconnects in social structure 
(Burt, 1992; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997). Such strategies enable those actors to 
access knowledge or information that has a high yield. In this context, direct as well 
as indirect contacts are found to be important. In terms of direct contacts, firms 
engage in local search based on social capital for extending their network. Regarding 
the indirect contacts firms should look for partners that have direct links to actors with 
whom oneself does not have strategic links. This enables them to bridge structural 
holes in the network. Since current alliance networks provide future alliance 
opportunities (Gulati, 1995; 1998; 1999), early participation may provide firms with 
potentially valuable possibilities for the future (Sarkar, Echambadi, Harrison, 2001). 
Thus, alliance proactive firms in networks are more likely to possess the specific 
knowledge that is required for identifying and selecting appropriate alliance partners 
(Sarkar, Echambadi, Harrison, 2001). 
 
In spite of these theoretical contributions, the literature is quite inconclusive about the 
performance effects of group membership. There is, especially, a strong lack of 
systematic longitudinal empirical studies that examine these effects. In order to fill 
this void we will test a number of propositions, derived from our understanding of 




Members of cohesive subgroups develop strong, cohesive ties through frequent 
interaction. Strong ties (Granovetter, 1973), are generally characterized by a solid, 
reciprocal and trustworthy relationship. This creates a large basis of trust and intimacy 
between the partners (Granovetter, 1973; Brass, Butterfield, Skaggs, 1998). Since 
trust is an important basis for knowledge sharing and joint learning, firms are   7
expected to be more productive in joint innovative activities. As those firms invest a 
substantial amount of time and energy to establish these strong relationships (Burt, 
1992), changing transaction partners in the short run is not likely, since it involves 
significant switching costs and implies a risk that existing relationships will dissolve. 
Thus, when trustworthy partners are readily available, searching for or switching to 
new partners is hard to rationalize in the alliance formation process (Chung, Sing and 
Lee, 2000). Actors rather replicate their existing ties than search for new ones (Gulati, 
1995, 1998; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997). As firms engage in local search, the basis 
of partner attractiveness and the ties between firms within blocks will remain or even 
strengthen (Madhavan, Koka, Prescott, 1998). In the context of strong ties and 
familiarity, joint innovative activities and the sharing of knowledge are expected to 
generate higher innovative performance than when firms follow an individual 
innovation strategy outside cohesive subgroups. Hence, 
 
Proposition 1: Members of cohesive subgroups are more innovative than non-member 
firms. 
 
However, as a result of (over)embeddedness (e.g. Uzzi, 1997), firms can also be 
constrained in their partner choice when facing opportunities for linking up with 
actors of another strategic block (figure 1). Once firms have established links with 
firms in a specific strategic block, the formation of ties outside that block can be 
difficult, because of the possible conflict of interest among its partners (Nohria, 
Garcia-Pont, 1991). This implies that some actors in blocks are locked in as a result of 
initial alliance choices and actors outside the block are locked out in order to prevent 
knowledge leakage to competing groups. Another reason for locking out actors of 
other groups is the implicit expectation of loyalty to group members, since many 
alliances preclude the parties from allying with firms from competing groups (Gulati, 
Nohria, Zaheer, 2000). As a result, 
certain partners are not available, 
because they are already tied to 
the focal firm’s competitors. 
Actors have limits to the resources 
they can devote to the search 





Figure 1. Overembeddedness   8
place constraints on ties with others (Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000). Therefore, some 
potential partners are simply excluded in the partner selection phase. This 
phenomenon of strategic gridlock (Gomes-Casseres, 1996) forces firms to engage in 
local search for partners within its own strategic block.  
 
Thus, in most alliances, partners are chosen on the basis of prior positive experience, 
where they rely on their embedded relations and social capital. Hence, the decision 
with whom to partner is influenced by the network of past partnerships, (Gulati, 
Gargiulo, 1999) and depends on the embedded relations the firm is already engaged in 
(Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998). As a result of this repeated alliance formation 
through local search and frequent interaction, the partners’ relationship becomes 
strong and similar. Similarity facilitates information sharing since the strong 
relationship constitutes trust. Since there is frequent interaction and high commitment 
in the relationship, a strong basis of trust and intimacy between the partners (Brass et 
al., 1998; Granovetter, 1973a) is created. This is also referred to as the “familiarity 
breeds trust” phenomenon (Gulati, 1995). Similarity can be a stimulus for interaction, 
or can be the cause of attraction. Scholars often refer to “similarity breeds attraction” 
(Brass et al., 1998) that increases the firms’ tendency to replicate their existing ties. In 
terms of learning we expect that, over time, overembeddedness (Uzzi, 1997) and 
similarity lead to decreasing opportunities for learning and innovation, (see figure 1). 
Thus, 
 
Proposition 2: There is a curvilinear (inversed-U shaped) relationship between 
cohesive group membership and innovative performance. 
 
2.2 Technology life cycles and strategic block formation 
In contrast to the general conception of new life cycles born out of market needs 
(Sherwin and Isenson, 1967; Utterback, 1974) high technology industries are typical 
examples of markets created by radical technological innovations (Mueller and Tilton, 
1969; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). At these early stages, there is often substantial 
uncertainty about the technological feasibility of an innovation and its potential 
market size.  
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Ultimately, those technologies which are most successful -in both technological terms 
and in meeting customer demands- will accumulate a critical mass and may set a 
technological regime and basic design. The emergence of a basic design leads to a 
substitution of radical technological development by more focused incremental 
cumulative improvements along a specific technological path or trajectory (Duysters, 
1996). Incremental technological improvements are structure reinforcing since they 
enhance and extend the underlying sustaining technology, and thus reinforce the 
existing status quo (Tushman, Anderson, 1986; Madhavan, Koka, Prescott, 1998) and 
bases of competition. Such technologies are also accumulative and competence 
enhancing (Tushman, Anderson, 1986) and support the way the industry is 
functioning.  
 
The establishment of a technological regime does not only lower technological 
uncertainty. Due to the adaptation of the basic design as the market standard 
uncertainty is also considerably reduced. From that point onward, cumulative 
improvements in technology are becoming more important than radical innovation. 
Since the industry is characterized by accumulative technological improvements, 
which are structure reinforcing, incremental innovation occurs through the interaction 
of many firms (Tushman, Anderson, 1986). This might lead to a situation in which 
cohesive subgroups thrive whereas firms that are particularly effective in bridging 
structural holes (Burt, 1992) are less effective.  Under these conditions, when 
innovation depends on a series of interdependent innovations, independent companies 
will have a hard time coordinating and tying these innovations together (Chesbrough, 
Teece, 1996). Hence, we expect firms to integrate these innovations by engaging in 
strategic block formation. Through strategic block formation, the firms within the 
blocks can enhance and extend the underlying sustaining technology (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). In this way block members exploit their existing capabilities by 
linking up with firms in their own technology cluster to improve their innovative 
performance. Hence: 
 
Proposition 3: In a situation of structure reinforcing cumulative technological 
change, cohesive subgroup members are more innovative than their non-group 
counterparts. 
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After a period of technological progress and considerable market growth, most 
industries undergo a phase of more moderate technological and market development. 
Saturation of demand is leveling sales growth towards zero, whereas technological 
progress seems to approach its natural limits. Faced with problems of advancing 
current technologies, firms need to invest an increasing amount of resources in R&D 
to make significant new progress. In order to speed up stagnating technological 
progress, firms should broaden their focus in search for alternative technologies. 
These search processes may eventually lead to new technological regimes or to the 
establishment of a new technological paradigm. Substitute technologies may offer 
better perspectives and may be able to trigger off new technological paths. These 
radical and disruptive technological innovations often drastically alter the 
price/performance ratio of high technology products and often act as forces of creative 
destruction, which threaten incumbent industry leaders and open up opportunities for 
new firms. Under these structure-loosening conditions it might be sensible for any 
organization to shift its attention towards the new technological paradigm. This 
“competence destroying discontinuity” (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Madhavan, 
Koka, Prescott, 1998) alters the way the industry functions and can radically change 
the bases of competition in an industry. The shift in regime also reshuffles both the 
current bases of attractiveness and the existing ties of firms in blocks and may thus 
result in an out-block orientation in partner selection. 
 
However, because technological change is radical and disruptive (Bower, Christensen, 
1995), the impetus for cohesive group members to move into this technology is not 
very high. Then, the reputation effects within the group are not offset by the potential 
rewards that can be found in engaging into these new innovations. Furthermore, most 
cohesive subgroup members are characterized by strong inertial forces, which prevent 
them from engaging in more innovative relationships. Group think pressures might 
even lead to situations in which incumbents even tend to increase investments in the 
old technology rather than to switch to the new technological regime (Foster, 1986). 
The inability of these cohesive subgroup members to explore new technologies paves 
the way for non-cohesive subgroup firms to take advantage of the new technologies. 
Non-cohesive group members however may have created a radar function of alliances 
in order to scan the most promising technologies. They can expect high rewards for 
bringing a technological dominant product to the market. Thus,   11
. 
Proposition 4. Under conditions of structure-loosening disruptive technological 
change, non-subgroup members have a higher innovation rate than their cohesive 
subgroup counterparts. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
So far we have seen that a firm’s innovative performance is contingent on both its 
position in various network settings, i.e. block-membership or non-block membership 
and is shaped by the nature of technological change and innovation, that is cumulative 
and incremental vs. disruptive and radical.  
 
As we have described in our first proposition we expect that block-members are more 
innovative than non-members. However, as firms become overembedded, we expect 
in proposition 2 that block-members become less innovative. In a situation of 
cumulative change, as stated in proposition 3, cohesive group-members are more 
innovative than non-block members. In this case the state of overembeddedness (Uzzi, 
1997) will be reached at a later point in time, because innovativeness is just supported 
by the virtues of closure and block membership. Then, through the strong ties, that 
represent trustworthy and reciprocal relationships, firms involved take advantage of 
the network externalities in their block. This makes them more productive in their 
joint innovative efforts, since these solid relationships are a means to transfer tacit 
knowledge in an exploitative learning environment. This state of overembeddness will 
be reached earlier in case of structure-loosening events, because they demand 
investments in new technologies instead of investing in the former technological 
regime. Therefore, we state in proposition 4 that under conditions of frequent and 
radical technological change, firms that are not restricted by block membership might 
be more effective in exploiting new technologies. Then these firms have the 
opportunity to link up with firms that have the most innovative technologies, without 
having to fear reputation effects that block-members have to face.    12
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